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THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY IN THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ITS SUCCESSES AND
SHORTCOMINGS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2005 ANNUAL
MEETING, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
SECTIONS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW;
LABOR RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW; AND LAW,
MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE
Professor Sharona Hoffman*: Welcome to our program on the
definition of disability. We have three terrific speakers today. This
should be a very interesting program. This program is being recorded
and will be published by the Employee Rights and Employment Policy
Journal. I am Sharona Hoffman. I am going to be moderating this
program. The format is going to be approximately twenty-five
minutes for each speaker, and then we will take questions at the end.
Our three speakers are, first, Paul Miller, who as of August 2004
is teaching at the University of Washington School of Law. Before
that he was one of the longest serving presidentially-appointed
commissioners of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). That is no small feat. I actually worked at the EEOC for
part of that time, so he is my former boss. Paul has also held several
other high-level federal government positions and serves on several
important national boards. His talk is entitled "Let the Wild Rumpus
Begin: the Definition of Disability Under the ADA."
Our second speaker will be Chai Feldblum, who is a professor of
law and founder and director of the Federal Legislation Clinic at
Georgetown University Law Center. She has been very active in
drafting and promoting legislation that affects the disability
community, and she is one of the authors of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).' Chai's talk is about the tale of two
cities: yes, perhaps one marginal neighborhood and one that's
experienced some development.
Finally, we have Mike Stein, who is a professor at William and
* Professor of Law & Associate Director, The Law - Medicine Center, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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Mary School of Law and, for the last year, has been a visiting scholar
at Harvard Law School, with additional fellowships in Harvard's
Human Rights and East Asian Legal Studies programs. Mike also
serves on several advisory boards of disability organizations, and he is
currently working on a draft of the United Nations (UN) Convention
on the Rights of Disabled Persons. He is going to be presenting a
comparative international study of the definition of disability.
Professor Paul Steven Miller*: Thank you very much, Sharona. I
am pleased and honored to be here at this meeting, to be with all of
you this week, and to be here as a member of this Association rather
than as an interloper. As we approach the fifteenth anniversary of the
passage of the ADA, one could say that the statute is smack in the
middle of its adolescence. Now, I do not believe that the ADA is, in
fact, the unruly teenager that some courts and business associations
would want you to think it is. Rather, I think the ADA is a repressed
child, one who is not allowed to become the person we expect or
envision it to be.
As Sharona mentioned, I originally titled this talk, "Let the Wild
Rumpus Begin," because, as the father of a five year-old daughter,
my frame of reference revolves around her reading list. However, as
I began thinking about this paper I realized that the title and the
theme were all wrong. I was thinking "children" when I should have
been thinking "teenagers." So, I toyed with calling my talk "The
ADA and The Chamber of Secrets," or "The ADA and The Prisoner
of Ashcroft," but those titles didn't seem right either. At the end of
the day, I decided to call this paper, "Yossarian's Law, Addressing
the Catch-22 of the Americans with Disabilities Act." The Catch-22
that many federal courts have read into this Act is, I think, one of the
greatest impediments to the ADA becoming the civil rights law that
its parents envisioned it to be.
Catch-22 is that mysterious military regulation from Joseph
Heller's novel of the same name that keeps Joseph Yossarian
engaged in the front line of war:
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified
that a concern for one's own safety in the face of dangers that were
real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy
and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he
did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more
Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
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missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he
didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was
crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had
to.2
The Catch-22 of the novel was used by military superiors to
retain their authority and preserve the status quo. It created a
situation where you think that everything is perfect, but then Catch22 applies, making everything impossible.
Catch-22 aptly applies to the problem with the way the courts are
interpreting the ADA. To prevail in a disability discrimination
lawsuit, plaintiffs must prove that they are covered by the ADA as a
person with a disability.3 Unlike other federal civil rights laws, courts
have defined disability so narrowly and stringently that once plaintiffs
demonstrate that they are disabled enough to be covered by the
statute, the courts find that they cannot possibly do the job: Catch-22.
In addition, even if one lost a job, or was not hired, because of a
disability, if the plaintiff demonstrates that he or she is able enough to
function regardless of that disability, he or she is not protected by the
ADA even though the disability was the reason for the
discrimination: Catch-22. The court never gets to test the disability
pretext for the adverse action because the plaintiff is not disabled;
again: Catch-22. A great majority of ADA employment litigation and
federal court opinions involve this issue of the definition of disability
that is, who is impaired enough to qualify for protection from
disability discrimination?
There are two reasons for the tremendous amount of litigation
over the definition of disability. First, it is easier to prevail against an
ADA claim by arguing that the person is not disabled than by arguing
that the accommodation is not reasonable; that the accommodation
presents an undue hardship; or that the person is, in fact, not
qualified. Second, courts seek certainty. Coverage under the statute
is determined by applying a contextual, flexible, individualized
definition of disability, and our judicial system abhors vagueness.
Standing under the statute is open to wide interpretation by a bench
that does not generally understand the social and historical context of
the disability experience. On the other hand, Title VII4 employment
discrimination cases are different because judges have a better
2. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 56-57. (1994) (1961).
3. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,475 (1999).
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
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understanding of the cultural and historical legacy of discrimination
that Title VII seeks to redress. Thus, while Title VII litigation glosses
over the prima facie requirement that the plaintiff belonged to a
protected class,5 ADA litigation rarely gets beyond this battlefield.
There are several rational and substantive reasons why the
ADA's definition of disability is structured using this individualized
analysis of who has standing. The disability experience, especially as
it relates to employment discrimination, exists in a social context, and
not simply within a medical framework. It involves the relationship
between the individual and others; a relationship between the
individual and the environment and the culture. By acknowledging
this social context of disability through the individualized analysis of
coverage, the ADA responds to disability myths and stereotypes and
seeks to achieve economic integration in a way similar to the means
used under every other civil rights law. Notwithstanding these very
valid rationales, the definition is not working. The courts are
excluding disabled victims of discrimination from the ADA's
protection.
In its rulings in the Sutton trilogy,6 the Supreme Court
heightened the likelihood that, by successfully demonstrating
disability under the statute, plaintiffs will be forced to prove
themselves out of the ADA's protection. The Court held that if an
otherwise substantially limiting impairment is corrected by a
mitigating measure, that impairment does not presently substantially
limit a major life activity and thus may not be a covered disability
under the ADA.7 Under these standards, impairments that were
previously routinely considered disabling, like diabetes and epilepsy,
were cast into a limbo of doubt because mitigating measures might
render these conditions not substantially limiting. As a result, courts
have been denying people with significant medical conditions
protection from employment discrimination arising from those
conditions.
For example, in On v. Wal-Mart* the court found that an
insulin-dependent diabetic pharmacist was not disabled under the
ADA. The underlying issue was whether the pharmacist should be
5. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
6. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Serv.,
527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkenberg, 527 (U.S. 555 (1999).
7. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
8. Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720,725 (8th Cir. 2002).
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allowed to take an uninterrupted thirty minute lunch break to eat
during his ten-hour shift as a pharmacist at Wal-Mart. Now, just
think about that for all sorts of non-ADA reasons. Wal-Mart was
arguing that the pharmacist couldn't take a thirty minute break
during his ten-hour shift as a pharmacist. Think about that the next
time you get your prescription filled. The uninterrupted lunch was
necessary for this insulin-dependent, diabetic pharmacist to regulate
his blood sugar and control his diabetes. Because the pharmacist was
able to control his diabetes through medication and diet, the court
found that he did not suffer any limitation of a major life activity and
thus was not disabled.9 Since the pharmacist was not covered by the
ADA as being disabled, the court never had to rule on the
reasonableness of the accommodation sought.10
Similarly, in Fraser v. Goodaleu another insulin-dependent
diabetic worked in a bank that had a policy of not allowing people to
eat at their desks. Because of this rule, Ms. Frasier was unable to eat
immediately following a drop in her blood sugar. She became
disorientated, passed out, and subsequently was terminated. The
district court granted summary judgment concluding that Ms. Fraser
was not disabled as she could control her diabetes by eating.12
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that there was a genuine issue of
fact regarding whether she was limited in a major life activity and
remanded the case.13
And, finally Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Service14 provides a
striking illustration of how the Sutton rulings have caused courts to
deny ADA protection to those individuals who have successfully
integrated themselves into the workplace. Though ultimately the
decision was reversed by the First Circuit, the district court in that
case found that a genetic amputee, born with only one functioning
arm and with the other arm ending a few inches below the elbow, was
not disabled and not covered by the ADA.15 The district court's
conclusion was based largely on the plaintiff's testimony that there
was nothing that she was not able to do because of missing a hand and
that the plaintiff demonstrated an ability to lift and move patients
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 724.
Id. at 725.
342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1045.
283 F.3d ll(lst Cir. 2002).
W.atl7.
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required for the job, albeit in a different and arguably more awkward
manner than an emergency medical technician with two functioning
arms. Since the plaintiff was able to perform the job functions and
was upbeat about her prowess at challenging physical tasks, she had
shown that she was not disabled.16
Each of these individuals experienced adverse employment
actions based upon discriminatory stereotypes arising solely from
their medical conditions. Yet, because they found ways to manage
and accommodate their conditions, they were denied the protection
of the ADA: Catch-22.
Oftentimes, courts confuse two separate and distinct issues in
their analysis of the ADA. They collapse the question of whether an
individual is disabled under the law with the very different question
of whether the individual is qualified for the job. Several federal
circuits have recognized the problem of the ADA Catch-22 and, at a
minimum, I think that the First and Ninth Circuits discussed this
paradox with consternation.17 They each seemingly invite the
Supreme Court to reassess the ADA jurisprudence of the last decade.
Particularly, they invite the Court to take another look at the Sutton
trilogy to opt for a broader definition of a qualifying disability.
For example, in Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus,™ the First Circuit
explicitly stated that "by demonstrating that his ability to work is
substantially impaired, he may demonstrate that he is unqualified for
the job and therefore excluded from ADA protection. If he does not
introduce that evidence, however, he may fail to show that he was
substantially impaired."19 Similarly, in a different First Circuit case,
the court noted the law required the individual to be both
substantially limited and reasonably functional.2" Now, in a Ninth
Circuit case, concerning a plaintiff with a learning disability, Wong v.
Regents of the University of California™ which was a Title II case, not
an employment case, the dissent insightfully acknowledged that, "a
history of academic success alone cannot justify the conclusion that as
a matter of law a plaintiff is not disabled. To do so places the ADA
16. Id. at 20.

17. See Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1042; Gillen, 283 F.3d at 24.
18. 358 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2004).
19. Id. at 114.
20. Calef v. Gillette, 322 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir. 2004) (Plaintiff diagnosed with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder and a history of verbal outbursts failed to show that he was
disabled or qualified for the job of mechanic).
21. 379 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2004).
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plaintiff in the 'untenable situation where success negates the
existence of the disability, whereas failure justifies dismissal for
incompetency.'"
One way of addressing some of the most egregious
manifestations of this ADA Catch-22 dilemma is to take a look at
modifying the ADA to establish a per se category of presumptively
covered disabilities for certain impairments. This concept of
establishing presumptive disabilities under the ADA was first
suggested in the scholarly literature by my good friend, Professor
Mark Rothstein, two years ago, in a Washington University Law
Quarterly article,23 and few if any other scholars have continued to
develop this idea. As Mark said, that article was met with deafening
silence. With a category of presumptively covered individuals under
the ADA, a prospective plaintiff in an ADA lawsuit would be
presumed to be covered by the statute if the diagnosed impairment
was defined to be a per se disability. If the impairment was not a per
se disability, the individual would need to demonstrate ADA
coverage through the existing, individualized, case-by-case analysis.
I believe that a category of per se covered disabilities would
accomplish several goals. First, doing so would focus ADA litigation
on some of the underlying discrimination at issue in the case. Second,
it would avoid some of the vagueness and uncertainty of current
statutory coverage. Third, such a measure may, in fact, reduce
litigation and promote settlement of cases because employers do not
have the incentive to roll the dice to get the case knocked out on
summary judgment. Fourth, it would implement the ADA in a
manner closer to Congress' legislative intent. The resulting change in
the definition of disability would diminish some of the effect of the
Catch-22 dilemma.
Justice Souter, writing for the majority in Kirkingburg, alluded to
the theory that there may be disabilities which are presumptively
covered by the ADA.24 He wrote, "While some impairments may
invariably cause a substantial limitation to a major life activity, we
cannot say that monocularity does."2' A presumptive disability
designation would be ill-suited for conditions that vary in degree or in
22. Id. at 1110. (Thomas, J. dissenting)(quoting Andrew Weiss, Jumping to Conclusions in
"Jumping the Queue," 51 STAN. L. REV. 183,205 (1998).).
23. Mark A. Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability: A
Proposal to Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 243 (2002).
24. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
25. Id. at 566.
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extent from person to person. Rather, per se disabilities would
include a limited list of conditions that are static and variable in
impact and whose symptoms are easily definable from person to
person.
Per se disabilities could be established through regulations
developed by the EEOC. The EEOC may look to other agencies and
other standards, like Social Security, workers compensation
schedules, or the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, even though the purposes of these frameworks are
different from the ADA. Disabling conditions such as paraplegia and
quadriplegia, insulin dependent diabetes, epilepsy, loss of limb,
clinical depression, schizophrenia, and bi-polar disorder might be
good candidates for per se disability.
The Catch-22 dilemma that has been read into the ADA by
many courts needs to be addressed and resolved if the statute is going
to mature and develop into adulthood and fulfill the promise of
responding to disability discrimination. A potentially politically viable
first step might be to look at adding categories of presumptive per se
disabilities in the ADA's definition. Thank you very much.
Professor Chai R. Feldhlum": I am glad Paul started with trying
to figure out how to describe the ADA as an adolescent. I often say
in my talks that I do not have kids, I have laws. One of them is this
adolescent who had his bar mitzvah last year and the other one is in
utero, which is the Employment Nondiscrimination Act. That's the
thing about having laws not kids: they hang around inside your womb.
The other thing with kids is that I can imagine parents saying, "If only
it was just us influencing the kids... none of those peers, just us."
Well, we have courts instead of peers and it has been a problem.
There is no doubt that there has been a problem in terms of the
definition of disability under the ADA.
This concept of the tale of two cities is from something that I first
wrote and gave as a talk four years ago. It was really after the Sutton
trilogy in 199926 that, legally, the major change happened in terms of
reducing the scope of coverage under disability. I think the question
for us as academics is to think about what there is to say, what there is
to think about, other than simply noting the next case and the case
* Professor of Law & Director, Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown University Law
Center.
26. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S.
516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
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after that in which it is so obvious that there is a problem with
coverage under the ADA.
Now, what the Supreme Court would say, what it has said any
number of times when it engages in statutory interpretation, is: "if
this isn't what Congress intended, let Congress tell us what it did
intend. If this is a Catch-22, fine, let Congress fix it. That's the point
of statutory interpretation."
Of course, anyone who has worked in any legislative setting
knows that drafting legislation is a lot harder to do than statutory
interpretation. That is one of the reasons that, in terms of statutory
interpretation, I am generally more of a legal process person interpret the words in light of the purpose underlying the law - and
not a strict textualist. My concept of the role of courts is as a partner
with the legislature in implementing the law, as opposed to a third
grade teacher with a ruler going, "You bad girl, you should have used
better words then that," which is the way I sometimes think of the
textualists when they admonish Congress.
So, the new stuff that I am going to say in this talk is in the spirit
of encouraging some new developments in the law. First, the
metaphor of a tale of two cities that I will go through here will simply
be a reinforcement of what you just heard from Paul, but with a
bunch of additional visuals to make the points clear.27 The marginal
neighborhood I will reference is based on the "Mike Gottesman
theory" as to why we've had some of these problems with the Court
and the ADA.28 And then the new development I will focus on the
most is: What are possible ways of addressing this problem of judicial
interpretation of the ADA? In light of how difficult it is to change
the ADA itself through the legislative process, what are other
creative ways to approach the problem?
Those of us who worked on passing the ADA had two
overarching goals. I think it is fair to say that one goal has come to
fruition and the other has crashed and burned.
The first goal had three elements. We wanted to change the
physical landscape for people with mobility impairments; we wanted
to change access to society for people with vision and hearing
27. There is a PowerPoint that accompanied this talk. The PowerPoint, with the visuals
referenced in this talk, is available by emailing Professor Feldblum at feldblum@law.
georgetown.edu.
28. Professor Mike Gottesman has never written this theory down in an article, but I heard
him present it on a panel we were on together.
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impairments; and we wanted to change the social landscape for
people with "traditional disabilities"
so that employers and
businesses would focus on "ability" and not on "disability.
First, with regard to the physical landscape. We wanted there to
be no more restaurants that just had one step in front of the entrance.
There are still some that do, but we wanted to develop the concept
that businesses have to retrofit if it is readily achievable. And we
wanted to establish the principle that if a business is making
renovations, then it has to ensure accessibility so long as it is not
disproportionately expensive.
Our main goal was to draw a line in the sand and say: "With
respect to new construction, from here on, if you build a structure you
have to be aware that society is made up of people who have mobility
impairments. You can't just build something with stairs and think that
you've made it open to society."
So, we wanted to change the physical landscape for people with
mobility impairments and we wanted to change the access to society
for people with visual and hearing impairments, and indeed, to
change the overall social landscape for the range of people with
"traditional" disabilities.
In an article I wrote called "Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons
from Religion, Disability, Sexual Orientation, and Transgender,"2 I
made the point that we are brought up in a society that has made
certain background decisions. For example, our society has decided
that most of our materials will be in writing. Our society has decided
we will grow up learning a spoken language (English) and not also
sign language. These are decisions we have made as a society.
Reasonable accommodations - having interpreters or having materials available in brail and on audiotapes - are measures that create
access to society for people who are also part of society. These
measures create access to the basic social landscape for those
individuals with traditional disabilities. Most people in society have
the idea that there is an "us," without any disabilities, and a "them,"
people with disabilities. They focus on the person's disability and not
on the person's ability. Goal number one was focused on people with
"traditional disabilities" and on opening up for them a range of social
access.
At the time, we were drafting the ADA, we explained that we
29. Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons from Religion, Disability, Sexual
Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 166 (2002).
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had an additional goal - what I call, goal or city number two. We
wanted to extend protection in employment and public
accommodations to people with a range of health conditions, even
those not traditionally considered "disabilities." And we wanted to
change the public's cognitive understanding of "disability" by
bringing into the category of "disability" people with a range of
medical conditions.
That is, we wanted the law to establish that "us" is a spectrum
and that all people have health conditions that might, at some point,
cause them to be unable to participate in society because of prejudice,
stereotype, an actual physical barrier, whatever. We wanted to show
that people in this group were also people with disabilities and, in that
way, to change the cognitive understanding of disability.
Just imagine which one of our goals crashed and burned: clearly
goal number two. We now have a situation of shrinking coverage, the
"Honey, they shrunk our law" reality. And that's what creates the
"tale of two cities."
As you all know, the ADA prohibits discrimination against
someone who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities of such an individual,30 or who
is regarded as having such an impairment.31 What we meant to
convey by this definition was that you have coverage (this is the
smaller circle) of people who have "traditional disabilities" (such as
being paralyzed, blind, deaf, or mentally retarded) and then, in the
larger circle, you have coverage for people with serious health
conditions: for example, a heart condition, a lung condition, epilepsy,
diabetes, or cancer. While these conditions are not generally ones
that the public thinks of as "disabilities," those of us drafting the
ADA certainly believed they were part of the definition of disability
under the law.
I still remember one district court judge dealing with someone
who had a heart attack, didn't get his same job back after returning to
work, and sued under the ADA. The judge basically said, "Well, I've
had a heart attack and I am not disabled."32 So, there are people with
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(A) (2000).
31. Id. § 12102(C).
32. See Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1996)(quoting the district court
judge who wrote, "The only evidence is that he has a blocked artery that was opened up by
balloon angioplasty. That does not show that he has a permanent disability or heart disease. I
know. I've been there. I had a heart attack." The First Circuit reversed and remanded the
district court's decision.).
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serious health conditions that we know are serious, but other people
do not necessarily think of as disabilities. And then, there are those
in this last outer circle - people with mild health conditions, arthritis,
or a limp, or whatever - that we also considered to be covered as
people with disabilities under the ADA.
So, how did we get from this ADA text to this picture of three
circles?
You've already heard some of this from Paul, so I'm just going to
emphasize one point. The mitigating measures that individuals with
impairments often take in order to function were never meant to be
taken into account when deciding whether a person is disabled.
Obviously, we were building off of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.33 We used the same language for the definition of
disability that the Rehabilitation Act used for the definition of
handicap: a "physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities."3 Obviously, for
the Catch-22 reasons, the court should not take into account that a
plaintiff has taken medication that brings her diabetes under control.
We felt that individual assessments would be largely irrelevant at this
stage of the analysis of whether someone has a disability. Just like
there is not a lot of effort expended in a Title VII case in deciding
whether a person is really black or really Jewish.
Of course, we recognized there would be a question if a person
had an impairment that wasn't really limiting her in any significant
fashion. Then she would not fall easily under prong one of the
definition without some individualized analysis. But that was really
okay. You'd tarry there but a moment because a different type of
individualized assessment would be available under the reasoning of
the Arline case.35 Under the Arline case, even someone with a minor
impairment would be covered if she was discriminated against
because of that impairment.
I was clerking for Justice Blackmun when the Court decided the
Arline case. I was very active in working on the opinion in that case.
The next year I was working for the ACLU on the ADA. It was like
I knew Arline in my bones. In Arline, the Court noted that Congress
was as concerned about the effect of the impairment on others as
about the effect of the impairment on the individual. With the clause
33. 29 U.S.C. §794(2000).
34. 29 U. S. C. § 706(7)(B) (2000).
35. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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"regarded as," an impairment that might not really diminish
someone's capabilities could nevertheless substantially limit that
person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others
to the impairment.
Jean Arline, a school teacher with tuberculosis, ends up not
being reinstated to her job as a teacher. One job. The job of teacher.
Not a range of jobs. One job. The court said Arline was covered
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because she was regarded
as having an impairment that limited her in the life activity of
working.36 It was only being denied work in that one job - that was
enough for the Court to establish coverage under Section 504.
So, under the reasoning of the Arline case, the simple act of
being denied one job, or of being denied one instance of access to
some goods or services, was sufficient to create coverage under the
law. What more could we want? Everyone was potentially covered
under the ADA under that reasoning, just like everyone is covered
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
How many people in this room are covered by Title VII? All of
you. You are all covered. You all have a race. Most of you may not
be discriminated against because of your race. You may not need
Title VII. But if for some reason you were discriminated against
because you were white, you would have Title VII to protect you.37
So, for us, the ADA was just like every other civil rights law. Once
we had prong three in the definition (the "regarded as" prong), we
assumed that if you could show that you didn't get a job or if you are
fired from a job because of your diabetes or because you didn't have
two arms, you would qualify for ADA coverage under either prong
one or under prong three. It was even better. We were giving people
two options for coverage.
Then, the Supreme Court began shrinking the city of coverage.
The minute you take into account mitigating measures, what you then
have is the current picture. This is basically the situation that Paul was
describing. Now, not all serious health conditions are covered - only
those serious health conditions which, despite medication or devices
or self-compensation, still make it hard for the person to function.
These are the conditions that are still covered - the ones that are not
effectively medicated, or controlled using devices, or whatever. But
this little triangle of people are also the ones most likely not to be
36. Id. at 279 & n.4.
37. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).

486

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 9:473

qualified for jobs because their conditions are not under control.
And in one of the true ironies of legal reasoning, Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Sutton cites the transcript in the Arline case in
the part of the Sutton opinion where she shrinks the coverage of
individuals under the "regarded as" prong.38 It makes you think,
"Honey, have you read that Arline opinion?" Justice O'Connor cites
the Arline transcript to note that imagining that coverage could be
created simply because one was fired from one job would seem quite
circular.39 But what's remarkable about that reasoning is that the
Arline court concluded that being fired from just one job was
sufficient to establish coverage, while the Sutton court decided the
opposite!40 You have to show that you are regarded as limited in a
whole range of jobs.41 You have to show that lots of people would
have discriminated against you. With mild health conditions, it is not
enough that you cannot perform just one job without an
accommodation, you must show that you would be limited in a range
of jobs. You have to show that the employer regarded you as not
being able to get lots of positions.
So, it is fair to say that goal two crashed and burned. I think the
reason for that has a lot to do with the power of the image of people
with disabilities as "not us," as opposed to people with health
conditions, that are "all of us." I also think that it has been hard for
the courts to adjust to applying the ADA definition of disability when
they are so used to applying the Social Security definition of
disability. Under that definition, a plaintiff definitely has to
demonstrate that he or she is unable to work. It is as if the courts
have done so many of those Social Security cases that I felt we need
to say to them: "You should take a brain shower from your last Social
Security Disability Insurance case; now you are doing an ADA civil
38. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
39. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. "We note, however, that there may be some conceptual
difficulty in defining "major life activities" to include work, for it seems "to argue in a circle to
say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason of [an impairment, from working with others]
. . . then that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you're asking is, whether
the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap." Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Sch. Bd. of
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (No. 85-1277) (argument of Solicitor General.).
40. The Court in Arline quoted the same statement from the Solicitor General quoted by
Justice O'Connor, but then expressly rejected the government's concern by ruling that being
fired from even one job was sufficient to establish coverage under Section 504. See Arline, 480
U.S. at 283 n.10 ("The argument is not circular, however, but direct. Congress plainly intended
the Act to cover persons with a physical or mental impairment (whether actual, past, or
perceived) that substantially limited one's ability to work.)
41. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479.
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rights case."
But let's not lose sight of the important fact that there is
continuing viability of goal number one, or what I call city number
one. If you are covered under the ADA (or your coverage is not
contested), then under PGA v. Martin42 you can demand a
modification of rules and policies so long as it does not fundamentally
alter the nature of the service. That's a key disability rights principle.
The Olmstead holding: that you can receive the services in the most
integrated settings possible also remains viable.43 The truth is there is
lots of good stuff left. Yesterday I received an e-mail about a case
won by a plaintiff that was about an emergency evacuation - where a
business has to have a plan when evacuating to make sure that
someone who has a mobility impairment does not get stuck.44 The
facts in that case were horrible. I think that there is some good
movement. It has been slow on the Olmstead Medicaid front, but
there is a more of a general sense of the significance of disability in
the public. I think the ADA has done that. The ADA has made the
public aware that civil rights includes people with disabilities.
I will now briefly address what I call "the Mike Gottesman
theory" - which is that the Court simply does not like employment
cases. Mike's theory - not written down anywhere, but articulated on
a panel he and I were on together - is that the Court feels that it has
become much too difficult for employers to deal with all of the
employment laws imposed on them. So, according to Gottesman, it is
very relevant that the trio of cases in which the Court cut back on
ADA coverage of disability dealt with seemingly semi-trivial
conditions in an employment setting: in Sutton, the twin sisters with
the eyeglasses;45 Murphy with the high blood pressure,46 and
Kirkingburg with the one blind eye.47 Then there are the other
subsequent cases where people with disabilities have lost: Toyota v.
Williams;4* Barnetf49 Chevron.50 These were all employment cases as
opposed to the Olmstead case or PGA v. Martin. So, the "marginal
42. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
43. Olmstead v. L. C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
44. Savage v. City Place Ltd. Partnership, No. 240306 (Montgomery County, Md. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 28, 2004), available at <http://www.evacuationplans.org/opinion_12_28_04.pdf>.
45. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471.
46. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
47. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555.
48. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
49. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
50. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
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neighborhood," according to Gottesman, would be the neighborhood
of employment cases.
So, here's a recap of the twin cities. Under goal/city number one,
we have people with traditional disabilities that are still covered
under the ADA and receiving important rights. Under goal/city
number two, there are people with a range of health conditions not
being covered under the ADA and, therefore, whose rights are not
protected in the same way. But (and I find this a fascinating
sociological point) lots of employers still act as if people with
diabetes, epilepsy, heart conditions and breast cancer are covered
under the ADA. And that's a good thing, from my perspective.
Actually, the importance of having a law say "disability" is
covered (even if the courts have shrunk what that word means) came
home to me very forcefully when I and my colleagues were debating
whether the Employment Non-Discrimination Act should be
reintroduced with "gender identity" added as a protected category,
and not just "sexual orientation" which the bill currently covers. One
of my colleagues argued strongly that the bill had to be inclusive of
transgender people. This lawyer said, "Let's stop thinking like
lawyers, let's start thinking like employers.'" For employers, having a
word in the statute makes all the difference. If you have protection
for transgendered people in the law that's going to make a difference.
If the word gets on the flyer about employee rights that is posted in
the coffee room, you get gender identity on people's minds.
It's the same with disability rights. We have an inclusive
definition in the ADA. The courts have totally decimated it, but the
employers are still operating as if the definition is broad. The word
"disability" is still on the poster of employee rights. So, whenever I
get a call about an accommodation that an employer should make for
a person with a health condition, I walk through the whole analysis.
Of course, I know that if the employer actually went to court, the
person with the health condition might not win because of lack of
coverage, but why bring that up if that does not seem to be the
conversation at hand?
Finally, let me turn to three possible affirmative ways to deal
with the shrinking coverage created by the Supreme Court.
Obviously, one possibility is to amend the ADA. Paul's suggestion
picks up and develops a slightly different way from Mark Rothstein's
suggestion of actually having a list. Obviously you would not want to
have a list if one of your goals is to expand the cognitive
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understanding of disability. But if you've lost on that point anyway,
you could at least get some of the advantages that Paul was talking
about by amending the law in that manner.
With regard to amending the ADA, there was an editorial in the
New York Times* and then an op-ed by Steny Hoyer in the
Washington Post*2 shortly after the Toyota case53 came out, that both
called for updating the ADA to restore its intended coverage. The
National Council on Disability report on amending the ADA also
recently came out.54 And I've written elsewhere that I think the
definition of the ADA should be amended to better reflect Congress'
original intent.55 So, I definitely think that amending the ADA is one
possibility that's high on the list.
But now I am going to talk about two additional possibilities that
I have either worked on or am working on now. Both these
approaches start with the assumption that there will not be a
broadened definition of disability under the ADA - partly because
there are health conditions that the general public will simply not
admit are disabilities because of all the negative stereotyping that
comes with being disabled. Even so, we know that people do not
think that employers should know all about their health conditions.
The level of public support for medical privacy protection is actually
quite high.
I worked for over ten years trying to get a medical privacy bill
passed in Congress. While public support for such protection is quite
high, the politics of getting that bill passed have been remarkable. It
has been remarkably difficult. One of the things my client, Janlori
Goldman, and I managed to do in 1996 was to convince Congress to
insert a provision in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act that said that if Congress failed to pass a law
establishing medical privacy protection by a certain date, the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services had to

51. Editorial, Revisiting the Disabilities Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at A10.
52. Steny H. Hoyer, Op-Ed., Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice O'Connor, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at Bl.
53. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v, Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
54. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA (Dec. 1, 2004), available at
<http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/pdf/righ ting_ada.pdf >.
55. Chai R. Feldblum, The Definition of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: What Happened, Why, and What Can We Do About Itl, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91
(2000).
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issue regulations establishing such protection.56
Those regulations have now been issued.57 But they don't directly
regulate employers. So, I think one could still try to get a medical
privacy bill that prohibited the misuse of medical information by
employers. That is, an employer could not disclose the fact that
someone has diabetes. An employer couldn't publicize the
information about an employee's health condition on an employee
website or misuse that information to fire the person, for example.
Such a law would not, however, get you accommodations. All it
would do is get you the non-discrimination part. So, a medical
privacy law would have to be coupled with what I call a workplace
flexibility bill.
A workplace flexibility bill would deal with a situation in which
an employee with diabetes needs thirty minutes to sit and have her
lunch. It would allow an employee to go to a doctor's appointment,
to go pick up a kid, or to go home and wait for the plumber. A
workplace flexibility law would not just address health conditions.
The point of the law would be to change the workplace more
generally.
I know it's not the topic of this talk, but I have spent the last four
months reading every case about serious health conditions under the
Family Medical Leave Act.58 And the law can be a mess for
employers because an employee can get a certification that he or she
has a serious health condition and then the employee must be
permitted to take intermittent leave which can be in chunks of
basically fifteen or twenty minutes without an undue hardship
limitation.59 So, even if it would be really problematic for the
employer, the employer has to give employees who have such
certifications on file intermittent leave.
To deal with these issues, and other types of problems that
employees have, I have a new project that I started on workplace
flexibility. Right now we have a real stalemate generally on labor
issues in Washington. What my project, Workplace Flexibility 2010,
wants is to have a workplace that takes into account and
accommodates life's emergencies as well as regular life, whether you
56. See Pub. L. No. 104-91 § 264, available at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pll04191
.htmlx
57. 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164. See <http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/finalreg.html>. See also
<http://www.healthprivacy.org> 2005.
58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2000).
59. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100-800 (2005).
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are taking care of your kid, taking care of your diabetes, or dealing
with the plumber. You are working full-time, but since you do not
have a wife at home anymore, we need the workplace to change. We
also need a norm that allows people to have satisfying and secure
careers that might be part-time or part-year and that can change over
a career. A person might be in one field for ten years and then in
another field after that.60
The challenge of my Workplace Flexibility 2010 project is that I
want to achieve these goals in a way that works for employers and
employees. And that's why I'm working with the lawyers from the
different communities. This is part of breaking the stalemate; to
imagine, for example, how the current law that is the FMLA could
work better. To figure out what's the problem when you have these
medical certifications on file and there is no defense for employers.
And then to work with the advocates to get this law, as well as others
that affect the workplace, to work better.
The reason my project is called Workplace Flexibility 2010 is that
by the year 2010 we would like to come forward with a
comprehensive national policy that would advance workplace
flexibility because the stalemate right now is extreme. Workplace
Flexibility 2010 signifies that we have a period of time in which to try
to imagine the new approach. I am not guaranteeing any changes by
2010. The idea is to work with the advocates to think about how
various laws that affect the workplace might be modified and think
about the type of public policies that will advance flexible careers
over our lifespan. That way, for people who have, for example, a
health condition that makes it necessary for them to permanently
work part-time, we will be better able to deal with some of the
benefits, health insurance, and pension issues that are currently a
problem.
We've got a tale of two cities, and maybe a marginal
neighborhood. My hope is that we're also ready for some new
development. Thank you.
Professor Michael Stein*: Sharona, thank you so much for
putting the panel together. Thank you, everyone, for attending, both
because it is Saturday afternoon and because, looking around, there
are quite a few of you who I think would be better suited then myself
60. See <http://www.workplaceflexibility2010.org>.
* Professor of Law, College of William & Mary School of Law; Visiting Professor,
Harvard Law School.
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to be up here. I wish that we could sit around a circle and talk.
Hopefully we can provoke some thoughts and questions and get a
real, interactive discussion going afterwards.
The topic of discussion is the ADA's successes, failures, and
some comparative thoughts about it. I thought I would just sketch
out what I think some of the successes of the ADA are and some of
the difficulties with it. I suggest to you that both those successes and
failures often are related to factors outside the ADA rather than to
the ADA itself. Specifically, these factors are not directly connected
to the definition of disability, but are contingent to and hooked on to
the definition of disability. Afterwards, I would like to ask your
thoughts on how you would define disability if you were, for example,
drafting a UN Convention or European Union (EU) framework
directive. Hypothetically, how would you define disability to avoid
some of these problems and learn from the successes and failures of
the ADA?
I think the best thing the ADA has done so far in the disability
project is through Title III public accommodations. Instead of being
excluded from the mainstream, where the disabled should neither be
seen nor heard, nor out and about in the world, people with
disabilities are now out and about and seen to a larger extent than
before. I believe that this has a very positive effect on social
consciousness raising or if you wanted to be technical, norm changes.
There are economic and social theories about this, but in plain
language, the idea is that once an employer might have never seen a
disabled person or rarely seen disabled people. Now she sees the
disabled every day on public transportation. Lo and behold there are
people with disabilities on that bus or train with her. Perhaps when
the employer has an applicant with a disability before her, she'll start
to think of that person a little bit differently because the disabled
applicant is now a member of her community.
The second effect is one that has to do with more broadly
international instruments. At last count there were forty-six countries
who had adopted either verbatim or near verbatim versions of the
ADA or at least words and phrases from the ADA - especially the
notion of reasonable accommodation. The EU and the UN, hopefully
rather soon, might be adopting some of this ADA language as well.
Third, there is a visibility effect internationally, Anecdotally,
when I go to conferences or when I speak to disability
nongovernmental organizations or international organizations where
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there are people from countries that do not have disability rights
legislation, a glint comes into their eyes and a smile crosses their
faces. They say, "Oh, but for an ADA! Oh, if we had an ADA!" I
wish that for them. But one should also be very careful for what one
wishes for because the gift comes with certain difficulties as well.
These last two effects really are not related to the definition of
disability, however. These are effects that are outside the actual
technical definition of who is disabled and who is not disabled.
Among the failures most would point to are the post-ADA
employment rates and the win/lose rates of Title I plaintiffs in federal
courts. Some of that is related to the actual ADA language. My
splendid co-author Anita Silvers and I have talked about the
definition of disability being lifted from the Rehabilitation Act.61 The
regulations from the Department of Health and Human Services
would give form, at least, to what a disability is or is not. Judges
would then not be left to discover a brave new world all on their own.
Professor Hoffman has also written on the benefits of a vague
definition of disability in the ADA.62 There is something to both
arguments. There are, as well, many factors beyond what's actually in
the ADA and what's actually in the definition of disability that have
affected how the ADA has - or has not - worked. You can see some
of those factors if you read through the 2003 book edited by Richard
Burkhauser and David Stapleton assessing employment provisions of
the ADA.63 More recently, you could also read Samuel Bagenstos's
article, hot off the Yale press, about the lack of a social network and a
lack of health care and transportation for the disabled.64 Bagenstos
explores how its very American, existential, that to believe that we
have civil rights that we can enforce to make the world level and
even, but that we haven't given people the ability by which to actually
and practically enforce these rights.65
Many people actually connect the failures of the ADA to the
open-ended definition of disability in the ADA. One of those people
is Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (referred to just recently by this
61. Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic
Discrimination, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1341 (2002).
62. Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213
(2003).
63. THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE
(David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003).
64. Samuel R Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L. J. 1 (2004).
65. Id.
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panel as "Honey") who stated extra-judicially that the ADA language
reflects the uncertainties about what Congress had in mind and
creates the problem with the scope of the coverage.66 According to
Justice O'Connor, because the legislative sponsors were so eager to
get something passed what passed was not as carefully written as what
a group of law professors might put together.67 Well, you just heard
from one of those law professors who put the ADA together. The
question I'd like to throw out to you - this is not a rhetorical question,
it is a genuine question that I hope you'll respond to afterwards and
give me some ideas - is whether the issue is really the definition of
disability in the ADA? Is the issue this technical problem of who is
and is not included or is it a broader question? Is it a larger issue of
whether judges, employers, owners and operators of public
accommodations, and other members of society are just not accepting
the disabled and/or the notion that the ADA is about rights and
equality? This is what Chai just referred to as the "not us" syndrome.
To be even more provocative and turn this around the other way, in a
disability-sensitive, accepting, Utopian kind of world, would it even
matter how we define disability?
The ADA is now in its teens. The number of Supreme Court
cases on the ADA is now rapidly approaching twenty. The Court has
yet to actually explain in any kind of useful detail what disability is or
what a reasonable accommodation is. What is very clear to me (Chai
touched on this point as well) is that the Court seems more receptive
to the notions of Title III and Title II coverage than it is to Title I
coverage. There is a downward ramp of less acceptance starting at
Olmstead,68 Bragdon,w and Martin™ The Court seemed quite
inclined, or at least receptive, in those cases to the idea of the most
integrated environment, the idea of individuals receiving treatment
from dentists, the idea of golf carts on golf courses.
Then, the Court slid down towards Lane11 where yes, we know
that courthouses ought to be accessible. Query: must accessibility
also extend to interpreters and something else beyond steps for
wheelchair users? We believe that the Lane case extends to voting
66. See Charles Lane. O'Connor Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15,2002, at A2.
67. Id.
68. Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
69. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
70. PGA Tour, Inc., v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
71. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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rights. Does it include other social services under Title II? I arn not
sure. Also, Lane was an extraordinarily narrow decision with, to my
mind, a narrow majority, with Justice Souter writing a separate
concurring opinion discussing sterilization, eugenics, and other things
that states have done that may not be so very equality-orientated.72
Finally, as we continue to slide down towards Title I we have the
employment cases, (Chai, I think got this exactly right) where the
Court seems extraordinarily reluctant not only to define disability and
to define reasonable accommodations, but also to accept the idea that
changing the workplace and challenging the role of employers and the
exclusion of disabled folks from the workplace as a different notion
from equality arguments. These cases are not really about rights but
are about something more than rights. We have gone from kind of
equal to more equality plus.
Look at University of Alabama v. Garrett13 one of my favorites,
with Patricia Garrett suing the university after being demoted to a
poorer job. This happened after Ms. Garrett underwent treatment for
breast cancer, a treatment that Justice O'Connor and her sister have
had. The Supreme Court, of course, did not reach the merits of her
case because Garrett was decided on Eleventh Amendment grounds.74
The Chief Justice stated in the opinion that it would be entirely
rational for state employers to conserve scarce financial resources by
hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities.75 State actors
could quite hard-heartedly, maybe even hard-headedly, hold to job
qualifications which do not make allowance for the disabled.76
Chief Justice Rehnquist also characterized Ms. Garrett's claim as
one for special accommodations.77 Query: I wish him only good
health, but is the Chief Justice not working at home and not attending
oral arguments, but only every now and then writing into the Court?
Is this an accommodation? Is there a possibility that a Supreme
Court Justice with having life tenure would not be reinstated after an
illness? Again, I wish Chief Justice Rehnquist good health. I am only
poking fun at his inconsistency.
Justice Kennedy, of course, emphasized the idea in his
concurrence that this case was not about rights. He chimed in with a
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 534 (Souter, J., concurring).
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
Id. at 364.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 374.
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concurrence that got us all excited to read about how society has both
overt and more inferential forms of discrimination and how we have
to guard against both kinds.78 When you read Justice Kennedy's
concurrence for the first time your heart starts to flutter and you get
all excited. However, in a paraphrase that would have Abraham
Lincoln turning in his grave, Justice Kennedy referred to the great
internal struggle between our own human instincts, which causes us to
ostracize unfamiliar folks, and the better angels of our nature that
sympathize with those disadvantaged by mental or physical
impairment.79 It is not about rights, but about something other than
rights.
This is when we turn to the international dimension. I am really
asking for your thoughts. This is not a rhetorical flourish. It may be a
pompous flourish, but it is not a rhetorical one because I really do
want your thoughts. I've been fortunate enough to participate in a
very small way in the UN Convention on the Rights of Disabled
People. One of the things we are working on is trying to figure out
what the definition of disability is or should be. Briefly speaking, the
fifth session is coming up at the end of January 2005.
I will read you the Convention's interim definition of disability in
the Article III definitions. It is even broader and more inclusive then
the ADA. The third and the fourth working sessions have not even
addressed the definition of disability because it is considered too
touchy and too politically volatile.
Disability in the Convention means a process rather than
something which individuals possess. The process of dissemblance
occurs when people with impairments experience barriers to their full
participation in society and their recognition, enjoyment or exercise
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in civil, political,
economic, social, cultural, or any other field. The definition of
impairment shall encompass full and diverse range of functional
impairments including physical sensory, neurological, psychiatric, and
intellectual, all of which may be permanent, intermittent, temporary
or perceived as impairment by society, but not necessarily by
individuals.80
What do you think the Supreme Court would say about that?
This definition has been out there for six months. Interestingly,
78. Id. at 374-75 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
79. Mat375.
80. Working draft on file with author.
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during the drafting there were several delegations, notably in this case
Canada and the European Union (you would not have guessed that it
was Canada and the European Union), who questioned the utility of
including an article on definitions. Also, Canada and EU, joined by
the Russian Federation and Japan, questioned the appropriateness of
including a definition of disability at all within the Convention. There
was quite a lot of feeling and political energy spent on the idea that
the definition should be open-handed to allow states, parties, or
signatories to the Convention, to take the Convention back and in
their domestic courts apply their own, culturally-sensitive,
appropriate definition of disability. The counterpart to that was that
there ought to be at least a floor beneath which these culturallysensitive, independent, local definitions of disability ought not to
exist. There are many places where, because they've never had any
form of disability rights, there is no definition of disability at all.
Interestingly, at the next session, disability non-governmental
organizations will not be able to intervene. If they are allowed to
intervene, if there is a change in that, it will be very briefly at the end
of each article. This is the Convention, by the way, whose password is
"Nothing about us without us," so the next session will be
"Everything about us without us." The definition of disability has
been no less controversial among the disability community and the
disability caucuses than it has been among the nation states.
Without identifying the sources, I will read you a couple of
comments representative of the email among the working group that
was looking at this. This is from one individual who is heading up an
NGO. Responding to the issue of whether we want to talk about
impairment or organize any concept related to disability around
impairments, the writer asks, why, then, are all the main organizations
classified by impairment? The organizations not only use impairments
as titles but are also congregated by impairment. Isn't impairment
part of our identity? This is a question that has been asked by
disability studies and others for a long, long time. I haven't seen a
proper answer to that yet.
Another comment from within the disability caucus agrees that
we need to keep disability as a social concept, e.g., the processes in
society, the way that they affect physical and administrative
environment, that affects impairments and not get drawn to diagnosis
of impairments. At the same time the writer says that we have to
insist on the plurality of disability groups because there have been
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different historical developments. Then she goes on to talk about
how blind people are different from wheelchair users who are
different from psychiatric users. The writer says that this difference is
neither right nor wrong, but there is certainly a tension here between
the groups.
If you were starting with a blank paper, as some hypothetically
are, what kind of definition of disability, learning from the ADA,
would be a better definition to use? That's an open question and I
hope for answers.
Another issue is that UN treaty monitoring bodies have been
criticized, and correctly so, for enforcement that has been largely
ineffective. With this Convention, the participation of disabled
individuals would be required as part of the process. This would occur
not only at the treaty monitoring body, but also on the individual
state levels of creating policies and enforcements. Ultimately,
however, isn't compliance more about the will to obey? Isn't what's
important the idea of inclusion and the role that disabled people have
in society rather than technical provisions or enforcement? Put
another way, regardless of the definition of disability, whether here,
domestically under the ADA, or internationally under the
Convention or in the EU under a framework directive, how can we
create an environment, best practices, or a scenario in which the
technical basis of who is disabled and who is not is less important
because we have better practices in place that include disabled folks
from the beginning?

